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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the realignments of the developmentalist discourse and 
strategy of the Brazilian military for the Amazon during the civilian govern- 
ment of the 'New Republic' (1985-90). It focuses on a case study, i.e. the 
official expropriation of the lands of the Yanomami Indians in the states of 
Roraima and Amazonas along the Brazil/Venezuela border. The analysis 
brings to light how, during this period, the military aimed at neutralizing both 
the pressure of environmental NGOs on Brazil's international creditors and 
the emergent democratization of decisions on land use in Amazônia. It shows 
how such attempts involved manipulating environmental legislation and 
ecological rhetoric in order to perpetuate military hegemony over the develop- 
ment of Amazônia to the benefit of mining interests. Finally, the paper traces 
the roots of these manœuvres to a geopolitical and economical model for 
Amazonian integration still inspired by the national security doctrine drawn 
up in the 1950s and 1960s by the Escola Superior de Guerra. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the military coup of 1964 the Brazilian Amazon has been sub-. 
jected to a new and aggressive policy of demographic occupation 
and economic development informed by a geopolitkal strategy of 
regional integration drawn up in the 1950s and early 1960s under 
the influence of the Escola Superior de Guerra (Arruda, 1983; 
Silva, 1967). In the 1970s and 198Os, the policy to develop Amazônia 
under the national security doctrine (Comblin, 1980) was carried 
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out through a series of plans such as Operação Amazônia, Plano 
de Integraçã0 Nacional and Polamazônia. These were intended 
to develop infrastructure (roads, airports, telecommunications); to 
allocate fiscal incentives and subsidized credit lines with a view to 
attracting business interests to the region; to open up programmes 
of public colonization; and to facilitate the implantation of large- 
scale agri-business, mining and forestry projects (Allen, this issue, 
83-90; Mahar, 1989: 9-45). In the 1980s the burden of the foreign 
debt was an important factor in increasing the role of the Amazon 
region as agource of raw materials for export and as a site for large- 
scale development projects designed to attract international loans, 
especially in the mining sector (Becker, 1990: Ch. 4). Throughout 
the decade the geopolitical concern of the military for the region 
remained an essential parameter for Brazilian development policy in 
the Amazon (Mattos, 1980; 1983), especially during the civilian 
government of the ‘New Republic’ (1985-go), whose detrimental 
environmental and indigenist policies have provoked intense 
national and international campaigns of protest (Albert, 1990). 
Amazônia is the home of approximately 60 per cent of the 236,000 
Brazilian Indians. Of the 526 Indian lands of the country, 71 per 
cent of lands and 98 per cent of their extension (794,000 km2) are 
located in that region (see CEDVPETI, 1990: 19-20). In their 
development plans for Amazônia, the military governments con- 
trived an indigenist policy specifically to open up Indian lands for 
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and to administer 
the social consequences of the encroachment of this new economic 
frontier upon these lands. These policies were put into effect 
through a series of administrative measures designed in the context 
of a complex dynamic of confrontation between military-business 
interests, national civil movements and pressure from the interna- 
tional media and environmentalist/indigenist non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
This paper analyses a recent configuration of the dialectical rela- 
tionship between the Brazilian official indigenist policy and the 
opposing national and international pressures during the ‘New 
Republic’ government of ‘democratic transition’. It examines the 
realignments imposed upon the developmentalist strategy and dis- 
course of the Brazilian military over the Amazon, both by the reper- 
cussion of NGOs’ campaigns on the sources of international loans 
and by the influence of the local indigenist movements on the 1988 
constitutional process.’ 
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First, I give a brief retrospective of official policy with regard 
to the legal recognition of Indian land rights between 1967 and 
1987. I then focus on a case study, namely, the delimitation of 
the Yanomami territory (1988-9) along the BrazilianNenezuelan 
border, in the Brazilian states of Roraima and Amazonas. Finally, 
I use the Yanomami case to illustrate the administrative strategies 
developed by the Brazilian military in order, firstly, to maintain 
their hegemony in planning the development of Amazônia for the 
benefit of mining interests and, secondly, to neutralize not only the 
role of the emerging civilian power in the definition of land use in 
that region, but also the pressure applied by NGOs against the social 
and ecological costs of the predatory exploitation of Amazonian 
natural resources. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMAZON AND THE MILITARY’S 
INDIGENIST POLICY (1967-87) 
After decades of mismanagement in the protection of Brazilian 
Indians from the advancing extractivist and agri-business frontiers, 
the Serviço de ProtGção aos indios (SPI), created in 1910, was 
abolished in 1967. This occurred amidst accusations of corruption 
and scandals involving various forms of collusion in the extermina- 
tion and exploitation of Indians - eighty-seven groups died out in 
the first half of this century (Ribeiro, 1982: 250). Pressure from 
abroad denouncing the SPI excesses led to the creation of the 
Fundação Nacional do indio (FUNAI) in 1967, during the Costa e 
Silva military government. In 1973, a new indigenist legislation, the 
Estatuto do indio (Indian Statute, Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973) 
was published. 
The purpose of this law was not only to repair the image of the 
country in the international press, but also, and more subtly, to 
accommodate the indigenist legislation to the requirements of the 
new development plans for the Amazon region. At first sight, the 
Indian Statute appears to contain a series of measures intended to 
protect Indian lands and to guarantee a system of medical, educa- 
tional and economic assistance for the Indians, all couched in a pro- 
tectionist rhetoric that echoed the humanist-positivist discourse of 
the original SPI (see Lima, 1987). On closer examination, however, 
one finds embedded in its text many clauses inspired by the military 
model of development of Amazônia, which are extremely harmful 
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to Indian rights. For example, there are discriminatory clauses, 
such as FUNAI’s legal wardship of the Indians who are defined as 
‘relatively incapable’; assimilationist clauses that take ‘Indian’ to be 
a temporary condition; and expropriatory clauses, such as the non- 
recognition of landed property of the Indians, the provisions that 
Indian groups can be removed from their own lands for reasons of 
national security or for the construction of public works, and per- 
mission for state companies to mine in indigenous territories and for 
FUNAI to lease Indian lands (see Oliveira Filho, 1985). 
In the years following the promulgation of the Indian Statute, the 
demarcation of Indian lands (which was to have been completed by 
1978) proceeded at an extremely slow pace, and usually only when 
forced by emergency situations. Thus, a mere 15 per cent of the 
identified Indian lands were legally ratified between 1973 and 1981 
(Oliveira Filho and Almeida, 1989: 15-20; Oliveira Filho, 1985: 22). 
At the same time, land conflicts involving Indian areas multiplied, 
and the mobilization of Indians and their white allies demanding 
the fulfilment of the protective clauses of the Indian Statute gained 
strength.* 
Under increasing political pressure, the military began to inter- 
vene more directly in the Indian issue, as the magnitude and fre- 
quency of these land conflicts came to be viewed as a threat to 
national security. The administrative mechanisms for granting the 
Indians official recognition of their lands were reshaped so as to 
curb’the advance of those claims based on land clauses of the Indian 
Statute, by then regarded as an obstacle to the economic occupation 
of Amazônia (Albert, 1987: 123-6). From 1980 the decision-making 
power for the demarcation of Indian lands was gradually taken 
away from FUNAI, which was considered too vulnerable to 
political pressures by the Indians and their allies (Oliveira Filho 
and Almeida, 1989: 49-50). In 1983, the demarcation process was 
entrusted to an inter-ministerial work group (GTI) headed by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (MINTER) and the Ministry of Land 
Affairs (MEAF), the latter under the authority of the Secretary- 
General of the National Security Council (CSN).3 The mandate of 
this GTI explicitly recommended that the economic activities of 
third parties already operating in Indian areas should be taken into 
account when deciding on demarcations (Carneiro da Cunha, 1984). 
Authorizations for private mining companies to operate on Indian 
lands were also granted (CPI/SP, 1985). 
The political changes which brought about the end of military rule 
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in 1984 neutralized the immediate effects of these measures, and 
under the civilian ‘New Republic’ the MEAF was replaced by the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform and Development (MIRAD), run 
by civilians. During this period, the publicly admitted military 
intervention in Indian affairs suffered a brief decline. But their 
continued influence in this issue, albeit unobtrusive, could be seen 
by the fact that the GTI’s work in the demarcation of Indian lands 
came to a virtual standstill. Between March 1983 and March 1985 
the GTI approved only fourteen of the fifty applications for demar- 
cation requested by FUNAI. A year later, thirty-six cases had been 
approved but were still blocked by MINTER, and, since democratic 
resurgence was by then fading, the military once more reasserted 
themselves in Indian affairs (Oliveira Filho and Almeida, 1985). 
The new Secretary-General of the National Security Council 
began to demand openly that ‘reasonable criteria’ be applied when 
it came to the delimitation of Indian areas, especially in frontier 
zones (Albert, 1987: 134-9). By 1987 the unofficial freeze on demar- 
cation of Indian lands had given way to an official recognition of 
the National Security Council’s role as decision-maker in establish- 
ing geopolitical and economic criteria for the reduction of Indian 
territories (Decree 94.945, 23 September 1987). 
In 1988-9, both the social mobilization around the writing of 
the new Brazilian Constitution, and the international campaigns 
launched by environmentalist NGOs denouncing the accelerating 
rates of destruction of the Amazon rainforest in Brazil, led to 
new changes in the official policy for the expropriation of Indian 
lands - a policy now more than ever regarded as essential if the 
military model for the integration and development of Amazônia 
were to continue. An analysis of the demarcation process of the 
Yanomami lands, carried out at that time, sheds some light not 
only on these new administrative mechanisms, but also on the new 
discourse in which this policy was expressed. 
YANOMAMI LANDS: CHRONICLE OF AN ‘ECOLOGICAL 
EXPROPRIATION’ 
Over the last twenty-two years, a large number of humanitarian, 
scientific and religious institutions, both in Brazil and abroad, have 
voiced support for the legal recognition of the lands of the approx- 
imately 10,000 Yanomami Indians in Brazil4 as a continuous area, 
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with the legal status of an ‘Indian National Park’, which would 
also be an area of ecological preservation.’ Finally, in August 
1988, the president of FUNAI announced an inter-ministerial por- 
taria (directive) for the demarcation of the Yanomami lands. This 
Directive (160), first signed in September, was curiously redrawn 
and signed again in November (as Directive 250).6 On this occasion 
the Minister of Home Affairs, in a reference to the pro-Yanomami 
movement, said that this directive was a reply to national and 
international concerns for the preservation of that Indian group 
and its habitat (Correio Brasiliense, 26 August 1988). FUNAI 
then launched a propaganda campaign in the mass media with 
the motto: ‘More than eight million hectares ’of Yanomami lands 
demarcated’.’ This measure was presented as an historic event in 
Brazilian environmental and indigenist policy. 
‘Yanomami Indian Land’ in Directive 160: 
A Double-dealing Demarcation 
FUNAI’s campaign was built around a blatantly misleading slogan 
claiming that the Yanomami were to be granted an area ‘equivalent 
to four times the surface area of the State of Sergipe’ (north-east 
Brazil). The public, however, were not given details as to the 
exact shape or legal status of that area. The reasons for this are 
obvious. The area of 8,216,925 ha supposedly being granted to 
the Yanomami represented a 13 per cent reduction of the territory 
that, in 1985, FUNAI itself had recognized as their traditional 
homeland.8 Furthermore, several villages were left out of that area. 
The result took on the appearance of a patchwork made up of 
twenty-two distinct sub-areas under different jurisdictions, in most 
cases contradictory to Yanomami land rights. 
Directive 160 did not, as FUNAI would have the public believe, 
give legal protection to Yanomami lands. Quite the contrary, it 
established an ambiguous territorial and administrative arrange- 
ment, the whole purpose of which was to appease national and 
international protests, while at the same time making way for 
their progressive expropriation. In the legalization of Yanomami 
lands, the duplicity of Directive 160 lies in the deliberate overlap of 
incompatible indigenist and environmentalist concepts, thus allow- 
ing for a double interpretation of the territorial rights of these 
Indians. 
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Let us examine the main features of this territorial and adminis- 
trative construct. Paragraph I of Directive 160 states that the 
‘ “Yanomami Indian Land”, with an area of 8,216,925 hectares, is 
for the purpose of its demarcation, in the permanent possession of 
the Indians’, and defines its boundaries. This paragraph contains 
the only relatively adequate measure in the directive, that is, the 
recognition of the Indians’ right to occupy an area which roughly 
corresponds to their traditional homeland. It would have been more 
beneficial to the Indians if the boundaries of the ‘Yanomami Indian 
Land’ had been corrected and brought into line with the concept of 
‘traditionally occupied lands’, for which provision was made in Arti- 
cle 231 of the new Constitution. 
Paragraphs II and III of Directive 160, however, establish an 
administrative and territorial patchwork within the ‘Yanomami 
Indian Land’ in complete contradiction to paragraph I, which 
declares that it belongs exclusively and in its entirety to the Indians. 
The ‘Yanomami Indian Land’ is thus fragmented into a mosaic 
made up of two kinds of areas with conflicting functions and status: 
-Areas that come under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Code 
(Law 4.771, 15 September 1965), i.e. two National Forests 
(Roraima and Amazonas), and one National Park (Pico da 
Neblina) which was established in 1979 (Decree 83.550, 5 June 
1979). These make up 5,781,710 ha and thus account for 70per 
cent of the ‘Yanomami Indian Land’. 
-‘Indigenous  area^':^ nineteen separate and disjointed areas 
enclosed within the National Forests and the National Park. Ten 
are located within the Roraima National Forest, five within the 
Amazonas National Forest and four within the Pico da Neblina 
National Park. The nineteen areas add up to 2,435,215 ha, that 
is, 30 per cent of the ‘Yanomami Indian Land’. 
It is worth noting here that the regulation and use of these con- 
servation areas (National Forests and National Park, now under the 
jurisdiction of the Brazilian Institute of Environment, IBAMA’O) 
in many respects contradict Article 231 (paragraph 2) of the new 
Brazilian Constitution, which safeguards for the Indians their 
exclusive rights to use the lands they traditionally occupy. The 
National Forests are areas where non-Indian economic activities are 
permitted, such as the marketing of timber and other forest pro- 
ducts, even though these activities are totally incompatible with the 
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Indian patterns of land use and exploitation of natural resources. 
National Parks, on the other hand, are designed to be areas of total 
preservation, and as such they involve certain restrictions on the 
Indians’ rights to hunt or gather forest products essential to their 
livelihood. In both cases, these provisions clash with the legally 
acknowledged rights of the Indians to their land and natural 
resources. Furthermore, tourism and recreational facilities may be 
developed within both kinds of conservation area, even though 
strangers are forbidden to enter Indian territories. I I  
By overlapping most of the ‘Yanomami Indian Land’ with con- 
servation areas whose status is incompatible with indigenous 
occupation, Directive 160 ensured that the exclusive land rights 
of the Yanomami would eventually be confined to the nineteen 
‘Indigenous Areas’, thus taking away from them the remaining 70 
per cent of their traditional territory which is necessary for their 
economic and social survival. In this way Directive 160 did not 
simply create an anomalous administrative framework, it was also 
a legal device designed to facilitate the expropriation of most of 
the Yanomami lands. The ambiguity as to whether Yanomami 
land rights covered the whole of the ‘Yanomami Indian Land’, or 
whether their exclusiveness was to be restricted to the nineteen 
‘Indigenous Areas’, opened up a loophole for legal manoeuvring to 
reduce the Indian territory further. The strategy was to force the 
Yanomami into a sedentary life and by so doing provoke such a 
change in their economic activities as to preclude their traditional 
spatial mobility over a large territory for hunting-gathering and 
shifting cultivation. In due course they would be confined to the 
archipelago of nineteen ‘Indigenous Areas’. In the meantime, those 
parts of the Yanomami territory which were to be expropriated 
would be temporarily controlled by a conservationist status until 
such time as deemed convenient to integrate them into the regional 
economic frontier, by opening them up to settlers and to timber and 
mineral exploitation. 
The Yanomami Archipelago in Directive 250: 
An Explicit Expropriation 
The structure of the expropriation plan built into Directive 160 did 
not, however, satisfy its authors. Two months later, they published 
Directive 250 with a new version of the demarcation.of Yanomami 
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lands. As we have seen, Directive 160 granted the Yanomami the 
right to permanent possession of most of their traditional lands, 
even if it was with the prospect of opening them up, de facto, in 
the long run. Its authors must have realized the political danger 
inherent in this clause, that is, that it left the way open to court cases 
against the inclusion of environmental conservation areas within 
Yanomami territory, which might spoil their plans to open up the 
area to gold prospectors and mining companies. 
The territory of the Yanomami has been invaded since 1987 by 
approximately 40,000 gold-panners (garimpeiros), who have taken 
over the headwaters of all its main rivers (APC, 1989, 1990; CCPY, 
1989; Albert, 1991). The federal government has been under con- 
stant pressure from the placer-mining lobby to legalize this invasion 
by granting prospecting rights on sites within the conservation areas 
lodged inside Yanomami lands (Correio Brasiliense and Folha de 
S. Paulo, 20 August 1988). The creation of the ‘Yanomami Indian 
Land’ (as defined in Directive 160) was regarded by this lobby as an 
obstacle to the fulfilment of their demands (Folha de Boa Vista, 
Pressure from the placer-mining business no doubt influenced 
the decision to amend Directive 160, and thus accelerated the pro- 
cess of expropriation of Yanomami lands which the National 
Security Council was already planning (Albert, 1991), although it 
was probably expecting to introduce mining companies into the 
area at a slower pace. By 1987, 37 per cent of the Yanomami ter- 
ritory had already been claimed: 27 permits and 363 applications for 
authorization to prospect for minerals had been registered at the 
National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) by Brazilian 
and transnational companies (CEDVCONAGE, 1988: 1 1).l2 
Let us briefly analyse the provisions of Directive 250. The first 
and most significant difference is that all previous reference to the 
Indians’ permanent possession and exclusive rights to usufruct 
of the so-called ‘Yanomami Indian Land’ of 8,216,925 ha - the 
show-piece of FUNAI’s campaign in August 1988 - has simply dis- 
appeared. The territorial rights of the Yanomami are now explicitly 
restricted to the nineteen separate ‘Indigenous Areas’ of Directive 
160. These are referred to, in paragraph I, as ‘lands traditionally 
occupied by the Yanomami’, an expression borrowed from Article 
231, paragraph I, of the new Constitution. In the constitutional 
text, however, the concept of occupation refers not only to dwell- 
ing sites, but also to the land used by the Indians for productive 
21 August 1988; CCPY, 1988: 4-5). 
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purposes, for the preservation of the natural resources necessary for 
their well-being and for their physical and cultural reproduction, in 
accordance with their own usages, customs and traditions. By 
fencing in clusters of villages that were mapped after one single 
survey in 1988 (thus including only sites occupied at that time13) the 
boundaries of the nineteen ‘Indigenous Areas’ as defined by Direc- 
tive 250 fail to take into account areas which are effectively occupied 
and used by the Yanomami on a long-term basis, and which are 
essential to their economic and socio-political activities. There is, 
therefore, a deliberate distortion in the use of the expression ‘lands 
traditionally occupied’ in the context of this directive, in order to 
circumvent the provisions for Indian lands in Article 231 of the new 
Constitution (see note 1). 
The lands excluded from the Yanomami traditional territory 
maintain essentially the same character as conservation areas as in 
Directive 160, except for a slight increase in the size of the Amazo- 
nas National Forest which increases the extent of the conservation 
units - 71.5 per cent of ‘Yanomami Indian Land’ - in relation to 
the ‘Indigenous Areas’ - 28.5 per cent. The safeguard that would 
give the Indians exclusive use of these areas, already weakened in 
Directive 160, was totally abandoned in Directive 250 with the sup- 
pression of the concept of ‘Yanomami Indian Land’ which encom- 
passed them (paragraph IV). In its place we find that the Indians are 
granted a vague ‘preferential use’ of the natural resources of the 
National Forests, a provision lacking any legal or constitutional basis. 
Lastly, paragraph IV of Directive 250 also determines that 
economic activities by non-Indians within the National Forests 
be subject to the exclusive approval of FUNAI and IBAMA. It is 
worth mentioning here that in July 1988 IBAMA (then the Brazilian 
Institute of Forestry Development, IBDF) made a proposal to 
regulate the use of these National Forests, in which mining was 
allowed within their boundarie~,’~ and that a law of July 1989 
authorizes IBAMA to grant mining concessions for mineral pro- 
specting in the conservation areas under its jurisdiction (Law 
7.805, 18 July 1989, Article 17). Through these measures, the 50 
per cent of Yanomami lands that have been transformed into 
National Forests by Directive 250 can be opened up ex officio to 
placer-mining or to mining companies directly by IBAMA with 
FUNAI’s consent. In this way Directive 250 gets around another 
fundamental provision of the new Constitution which states that 
all decisions regarding the exploitation of mineral resources in 
Indian lands must be approved by the National Congress and by the 
Indians themselves (Article 49-XVI; 176 0 1 O and 23 1 0 3” and 0 7”). 
In short, Directive 250 annuls the creation of the ‘Yanomami 
Indian Land‘ and leaves only its internal subdivisions, i.e. nineteen 
small and disjointed ‘Indigenous Areas’ inserted within three conser- 
vation units. As an instrument for the expropriation of Indian lands 
it is much less ambiguous than Directive 160. Half of Yanomami 
territory, transformed into National Forests, is no longer recognized 
as Indian land, and can thus be delivered directly into the hands of 
mining interests, via the regulations for these so-called conservation 
units, and according to the agencies that have jurisdiction over 
them. 
NATIONAL FORESTS: MINING INTERESTS AND 
ECOLOGICAL RHETORIC 
In February and March 1989, Directive 250 became twenty- 
one presidential decrees that sealed the dismemberment of the 
Yanomami territory.” At the same time the regional superinten- 
dent and the local administrator of FUNAI officially admitted that 
the gold-panners had as much right to use the National Forests 
as the Indians (see Manchete, 28 January 1989 and O Jornal, 24 
February 1989). In April 1989, the justification for a new decree 
regulating placer-mining activities and signed by the Minister of 
Home Affairs and the head of the Secretariat for National Defence 
(SADEN),I6 stated that ‘mining activities are not incompatible with 
the concept of National Forest’.17 In July, a committee chaired 
by the Minister of Mines and Energy, with members of FUNAI, 
IBAMA, SADEN and the Governor of Roraima, announced the 
legalization of placer-mining in the National Forest with the crea- 
tion of ‘placer-mining reserves’ (see Folha de S. Paulo, 26 July 
1989). The announcement followed the recommendations of ‘Pro- 
ject Meridian 62’ of the Roraima government, according to which 
‘placer-mining will be a priority in the National Forest of Roraima 
in those areas where this activity is already being carried out7 
(Governo de Roraima, 1989). Three of these ‘placer-mining reserves’ 
were officially created in January and February 1990.l8 
One-and-a-half years after it began, the process that purported to 
regulate Yanomami lands showed its true face, and revealed its real 
purpose, i.e. to surrender the largest part of the Indians’ territory to 
. .  
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the placer-mining lobby. The demarcation of ‘Indigenous Areas’ 
surrounded by conservation units that had been proclaimed as an 
historical indigenist and environmentalist achievement, proved to 
be no more than a trick by the Brazilian government for getting 
around the new Constitution’s provisions regarding Indian lands, 
and for ‘greening’ the plans for the military-plus-business occupa- 
tion of the northern Amazon region. 
Indeed, it was with the intention of ‘greening’ the expropriation 
of most Yanomami lands that Directive 250 dressed its rhetoric 
with such environmental concerns as the need to preserve the head- 
water ecosystems of west Roraima and the need for ecological 
buffer zones (‘green belts’) to protect the habitat of the Indians. 
The rhetorical dimension and strategic function of this recourse 
to environmentalist language and environmental legislation is con- 
firmed by other factors. First, concern with the environment 
appeared in the developmentalist discourse of the Brazilian state 
precisely at a time when an effort was being made to bury the 
legal concept of an ‘Indian National Park’. Corresponding to the 
concept of ‘Cultural Park’ (CS, 1985:25), this would have been 
the only measure that could have adequately harmonized environ- 
mental concerns with the recognition of Indian land rights (Gaiger, 
1989b: 21). Moreover, the forests in Indian territories were, by law, 
meant to be permanently pre~erved;’~ therefore, if the main pur- 
pose of Directive 250 was really to protect the environment of Indian 
lands, then nothing would have been better than to demarcate the 
whole of the Yanomami traditional territory using the boundaries 
ratified by FUNAI in 1985 (see note 8). As for the creation of alleged 
‘green belts’ around Yanomami ‘Indigenous Areas’, far from being 
additional ecological buffer zones, they were taken out of the land 
traditionally occupied by the Yanomami. The only appropriate legal 
solution for the protection of these Indians and their habitat was 
thus discarded in favour of National Forests (and a National Park) 
which were open to non-Indians and offered no legal guarantee to 
the Indians. By choosing to create these environmental units, the 
authorities deliberately restricted the exclusive land rights of the 
Yanomami to less than 30 per cent of their original territory.20 
Such distortion of environmental concepts and legislation for the 
purpose of reducing and fragmenting the Yanomami territory is 
not an isolated case. The lands of many other Indian groups in the 
frontier zone of the northern Amazon region suffered similar treat- 
ment in 1988 and 1989. The territories of the sixteen Indian groups 
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of the upper Rio Negro region were also cut up into fourteen 
‘Indigenous Coloniesy2’ or ‘Indigenous Areas’ and eleven National 
Forests, representing a loss of 61 per cent of the traditional lands 
over which they had exclusive rights (Buchillet, 1990: 134,. Table 
III). In the same way, six groups in the states of Acre and South 
Amazonas had their lands carved up into twenty ‘Indigenous Col- 
onies/Areas’ and six National Forests, thus losing 34 per cent of 
their territory (Guimarães, 1989b: 76-7). Demarcation studies have 
also been carried out for the Waiãpi Indians of Amapá, with a 
resulting land loss of 23 per cent.22 
The recurrence of this model of ecological expropriation of 
Indian lands in northern and western Amazônia reveals a systematic 
policy. In fact, this policy is based on a series of projects and mea- 
sures from the National Security Council (later SADEN) over the 
last few years, designed to put into effect a geopolitical framework 
of military and economic occupation in the frontier zone of the 
Brazilian Amazon (Guimarães, 1988).23 Two of these projects have 
appeared so far: the Calha Norte Project launched in 1985 (Albert, 
1987, 1991; Allen, 1992; Miyamoto, 1989; Oliveira Filho, 1990b; 
Santilli, 1987, 1990; SG/CSN, 1985, 1988), and the Programa de 
Desenvolvimento da Faixa de Fronteira da Amazônia Ocidental 
(PROFFAO) being studied since 1989 (Bayma Denys, 1989; CIMI, 
1989). These are to be complemented by a network of land portions 
reserved for the military throughout Amazônia: two decrees signed 
in 1988-9 granted the military thirty-five plots of land in the region, 
with a total area of 6,206,015 ha.24 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND AMAZONIAN 
GEOPOLITICS: THE PMACl AND NOSSA NATUREZA 
PROGRAMMES 
The tropical forest of Amazônia is notorious for its ecological 
vulnerability, and north Amazon for its important Indian popula- 
tion. Given that both features have become increasingly sensitive 
issues in relation to the establishment of Brazilian development 
policies with international loans, SADEN adopted a strategy 
between 1986 and 1989 to take direct control of environmental 
and indigenist policy, in order to guarantee the continuity of its 
geopolitical planning in the Amazon region. 
As part of the Calha Norte Project, the Secretariat-General of the 
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National Security Council took upon itself, first unofficially in 
1985, and then officially in 1987, the total control of the process of 
demarcation of Indian lands.25 The rationale for this move rested 
on the argument that Indian affairs have a significant bearing on 
many subjects that come directly under its jurisdiction, such as 
national integration and sovereignty, the integrity of national patri- 
mony and social peace.26 Apparently judging Brazilian Indians to 
be subversive non-citizens, the military have been developing an 
indigenist policy aimed at the systematic reduction of Indian lands 
on the border strip of the Amazon region, and the political isolation 
of the Indians through severance of all their links with support 
groups and institutions. In the Yanomami case, this policy was 
demonstrated by the expulsion from their territory of the medical 
teams working for the Comissão pela Criação do Parque Yanomami 
(CCPY), a São Paulo-based NGO, and the breaking up of the 
Yanomami territory (Albert, 1991). 
The first direct interference of the National Security Council 
in Amazon environmental policy occurred in 1988, when it took 
charge of the Projeto de Proteçã0 do Meio Ambiente e das Com- 
unidades Indigenas (PMACI). Until then, the PMACI had been the 
responsibility of the Secretariat for Planning of the Presidency of 
the Republic (SEPLAN). The Brazilian government created the 
PMACI in order to meet the requirements for protection of the 
environment and of Indians lands which were set as conditions for 
a loan of US$146.7 million from the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), for the paving of the BR-364 highway from Porto 
Velho (state capital of Rondonia) to Rio Branco (state capital of 
Acre). The National Security Council took command of the PMACI 
precisely at a time when national and international environmental 
organizations protesting against the road project had put so much 
pressure on the IDB that it had decided to suspend the loan 
(Allegretti, 1988). 
In August 1988 the authors of PMACI presented a definitive 
action plan, drawn up under the strict control of the National 
Security Council, proposing (with IDB financing) a complex zoning 
system consisting of conservation units, areas for extractive activi- 
ties (rubber tapping) and Indian areas in Acre and in the south of 
Amazonas. The stated purpose of the system was to soften the social 
and enviroqmental impact on the region of the paving of the 
BR-364. However, one can clearly recognize the pattern for reduc- 
ing Indian land once again being applied by the National Security 
The Environment, the Military and the Yanomami 49 
Council on this project: the PMACI zoning plan cut up the lands 
of the Apurinã, Kasharari, Kashinawa, Paumari, Yamamadi and 
Yaminawa Indians into a mosaic of twenty ‘Indigenous Areas’ 
and ‘Indigenous Colonies’ and six National Forests (Guimarães, 
1989b: 76-7). The pattern is identical to the land reduction of the 
Yanomami and of the Indian groups of the upper Rio Negro. 
Despite the protests that came from local Indian leaders,27 the 
PMACI was hurriedly approved in September 1988 and presented 
to the IDB, thus assuring that credit would again be forthcoming 
to finish the paving of the BR-364 highway. Even though the IDB 
had strong reservations about the guarantee of Indians’ rights to 
the National Forests carved into their territory (called ‘associated 
forests’), it apparently allowed itself to be convinced into disburs- 
ing the loan by the environmentalist rhetoric of the Brazilian 
delegation, which, ironically enough, invoked the Yanomami 
case as an example of successful economic and ecological zoning 
(July 1989).*’ (Two years later, only four ‘Indigenous Areas’ and 
two National Forests had been created; see Jornal do Brasil, 16 
November 1990). 
The next step in SADEN’S incursion into Amazonian environ- 
mental policy was the launching, in October 1988, of the Programme 
for the Defence of the Legal Amazônia Ecosystem Complex - 
Programa Nossa Natureza (Decree 96.944, 12 October 1988). Its 
aim was to develop a propaganda campaign of ecological con- 
cern as a response to the growing pressures coming from the move- 
ments for the protection of the Indians and the preservation of 
the rainforest against large-scale economic projects in Brazilian 
Amazônia. 
The Programa Nossa Natureza came into being after two years of 
intensive press coverage of apocalyptic burnings of the Amazonian 
forest for agri-business. The Brazilian National Institute for Space 
Studies (INPE) showed estimates of forest destruction in 1987 and 
1988 (204,608 and 300,000 km2 respectively) which attracted an 
enormous amount of attention from the press both in Brazil and 
abroad.29 Just after the decree that created the Programa Nossa 
Natureza had been signed, several major events took place, includ- 
ing the murder of Chico Mendes, the leader of the rubber tappers, 
in December 1988 (CNS, 1989), and the meeting of the Kayapó 
Indians in Altamira, in February 1989, to protest against the build- 
ing of the Kararao dam on the Xingu river (Turner, 1989). This was 
a period of intense mobilization for various social movements in 
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Amazônia (Almeida, 1989). All this added to the increasing interest 
of the international media in the destruction of the Amazon 
forest. Last but not least, foreign governments and multilateral 
agencies began to pressurize Brazil into taking environmental pro- 
tection measures, a role that had previously been associated with 
NGOS.~' 
The first step taken by the Executive Committee of the Programa 
Nossa Natureza (headed by the Secretary-General of the SADEN 
and dominated by five of its members) was to set up six inter- 
ministerial work groups (GTIs) charged with studying, proposing 
and promoting measures for the protection of Ama~ônia.~'  The 
work groups were defined as follows: 
I. Protection of the Forest. 
II. Chemical Substances and Inappropriate Mining Processes. 
III. Structure of the Environmental Protection System. 
IV. Environmental Education. 
V. Research. 
VI. Protection of the Environment, of Indian Communities and 
The results of these work groups can be found in the drafts of 
twenty-two legal texts (laws, decrees and directives); in twenty-five 
memoranda from the President of the Republic to the appropriate 
ministers, making various recommendations on different measures 
to be taken; and in the publication of four decrees, creating three 
National Parks and one Biological Reserve. 
The announcement of these results, in April 1989, was the occa- 
sion for a great media event, orchestrated by SADEN for the 
benefit of the national and international press, where once again 
the Yanomami case was used as an example (IBAMA, 1989b: 15). 
Significantly enough, this event was preceded by a raging campaign 
on the part of the military against the threat of an 'internationaliza- 
tion of Amazônia', the supposed aim of the indigenist and environ- 
mental Here we see a curious inversion of the position 
of leftists who, in the 1970s, accused the military of handing over 
Amazônia to the multinationals (Ribeiro, 1989). 
The launching of the Programa Nossa Natureza also had reper- 
cussions on the diplomatic front. The Brazilian government mobi- 
lized the members of the Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation .(which 
resulted in the March 1989 Declaration of Quito, and in a meeting 
in Manaus in May of the same year), for the purpose of reinforcing, 
at the regional level, its disavowal of the international debate on the 
Populations involved in Extractive A~t iv i t ies .~~ 
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ecological protection of Amazônia, seen as a threat to national 
sovereignty and security (Santilli, 1989b). 
Once the measures that made up the Programa Nossa Natureza 
had served their purpose as political propaganda, the programme’s 
projects were sent to Congress between April and July 1989. Thanks 
to timely action on the part of NGOs and members of the Parlia- 
mentary Committee on the Environment, many of those projects 
went through significant changes, removing anti-democratic clauses 
and technical improprieties (IBAMA, 1989b; Oliveira and Born, 
1989). None the less, at its core, the programme maintained the 
same strategy of ecological expropriation observed in the case of the 
Y anomami lands. 
The main purpose of GTI VI (Protection of the Environment, 
of Indian Communities and Populations involved in Extractive 
Activities) was to systematize the procedures for the environmental- 
economic planning of the PMACI, to apply its zoning model to 
other areas and to find international funding for these projects. 
Unlike the other GTIs, it did not produce results in policy, apart 
from one law creating a National Environmental Fund (Law 7.797, 
10 July 1989), and one memorandum to the Minister of Agriculture 
giving priority to the implantation of Extractivist Reserves (see 
Menezes, 1990 on these). However, its activities have been pro- 
longed for an indefinite period, and it has been placed under the 
direct control of the Executive Committee of the Programa Nossa 
Natureza (Decree 97.636, 10 April 1989 and SADEN Directive 60, 
25 July 1989). Furthermore, an examination of its budget for 1990 
reveals that it is to carry out the territorial planning, following 
the PMACI model, of nine priority areas in Amazônia. These 
are: XingÚ/Iriri; lower Rio Negro/Uatumã; middle and lower 
Tapajós; Carajás; upper Capim and lower Tocantins; Tocantins/ 
Araguaia; Rio Branco; Juruena and Rio Araguari (IBAMA, 1989b: 
57). Finally, in total disregard of the new Constitution, the ‘socio- 
economic assumptions’ laid down by SADEN as guidelines for the 
work of GTI VI with Indian populations, subject the definition of 
their lands to ‘the development of these communities with a view to 
their total integration into the regional 
It appears then that SADEN’s intention was to transform GTI VI 
into a kind of parallel territorial zoning agency, directly guided by 
military geopolitical orientations, for the purpose of legitimizing 
and expanding its model of ecological expropriation of Indian 
lands (a patchwork of ‘Indigenous Areas’PIndigenous Colonies’ and 
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National Forests) so as to cover all of Amazônia under the cloak of 
the national-environmentalist propaganda of the Programa Nossa 
Natureza (Leitiio, 1990: 111-2). 
MINERAL INVESTMENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN 
NORTHERN AMAZôNIA: THE CALHA NORTE PROJECT 
So far we have seen how the military projects for the, territorial 
zoning of Amazônia, by manipulating environmental legislation, 
were dressed in administrative mechanisms to allow the progressive 
opening up of Indian lands to the economic frontier at a time of 
worldwide NGO mobilization. We now examine the economic and 
geopolitical goals underlying these projects, taking as an example 
the role of mining interests in the implementation of the Calha Norte 
Project. 
The Calha Norte Project encompasses 6771 km of Brazil’s 
northern border, and involves substantial public funding intended 
to increase military occupation, develop communication and trans- 
port networks, energy resources and basic services, with a view to 
attracting settlers and investments to the region. More precisely, the 
text of the project, as well as other studies by the Secretariat-General 
of the National Security Council, make clear that the planned basis 
for the development of the Calha Norte area rests on the exploration 
of its considerable mineral potential and not on its agricultural 
occupation (Oliveira Filho, 1990b: 24-5). In this perspective, the 
military consider that the legal limitations put on mining by the 
presence of extensive Indian lands in this region constitute a crucial 
obstacle to its economic integration. They express this view very 
clearly, for example, about the Yanomami lands: 
The main problem of the mineral exploration in the State of Roraima, as in 
other regions of the Solimões and Amazonas river basin, rests on the fact that 
the areas surveyed as richer in mineral deposits are situated in indigenous, or 
presumably indigenous lands, this being especially notable in the region inhabited 
by the Yanomami Indians. (SG-CSN Study 10, 1985 quoted in Oliveira Filho, 
1990b: 25) 
These considerations make it obvious that the rationale for the 
Calha Norte Project, as a project for ‘bringing poles of develop- 
ment into the interior, under military control, revolves around a 
strategy to reduce Indian territories in order to facilitate the access 
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of large-scale mining companies and placer-mining groups to the 
deposits located in these lands. 
The mineral interests concentrated on the border strip of northern 
Brazil represent a formidable threat to Indian lands.35 There are 
approximately 243,000 km2 of Indian lands in this region (data 
from 1987). There are seventy-six permits and 973 applications 
for permission to conduct mineral prospecting registered at the 
National Department of Mineral Production, on twenty-two of the 
forty-nine Indian territories officially recognized as such within 
the 150 km-wide strip along the northern frontier, which is con- 
sidered a national security zone (see note 23). The area covered by 
these prospecting authorizations totals approximately 93,872 km2. 
This means that mineral rights to the subsoil of 39 per cent of 
the Indian territories in the region have been allocated to mining 
companies, most of them Brazilian private companies, for future 
prospecting and e~plo i ta t ion .~~ 
In this context, it is significant that the Indian areas where ecolo- 
gical expropriations were carried out in 1988-9 under the Calha 
Norte Project - the Tukano, Baniwa and Maku lands of the upper 
Rio Negro were reduced by 61 per cent, and the Yanomami lands 
of west Roraima by 70 per cent - are precisely the areas with the 
greatest mining potential in northern Amazônia. It is no coincidence 
that the largest areas of Amazônia reserved for the army are also 
located in these two regions. The lands of the upper Rio Negro are 
the object of 17 permits and 359 applications for mineral prospec- 
ting, and the Yanomami lands of 27 permits and 363 applications, 
adding up to a total of 766 mineral prospecting titles, or 73 per cent 
of all the titles registered for the northern border area. It should 
not be forgotten, furthermore, that the Indian lands of that area 
have also been invaded by a large number of unregistered, small- 
scale placer-mining outfits, operating in fourteen of the forty-nine 
officially recognized Indian areas of the region. 
The central position which mining interests hold in the efforts of 
the Brazilian military to carry out a territorial zoning in the northern 
Amazon is not only a matter of economic development, but also a 
question of geopolitical strategy. From the angle of the doctrine of 
national security, the military intelligence circle regards the cam- 
paigns to preserve the Amazon forest and protect Indian land rights 
as subversive manoeuvres by foreign interests against Brazil’s 
national sovereignty. The concern is that these ‘foreign interests’ 
could support the delimitation of large Indian reserves in the border 
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areas of Amazônia and transform them, in the long run, into 
hotbeds of separatist ethnic revendications. Accusations against this 
supposed international plot have a precise link, in military reports, 
with the mineral question in northern Amazônia: 
The suspicion of the existence of manipulations over indigenous lands gets 
stronger when one gives attention to the high frequency with which these areas 
expand and join each other towards the regions where rich mineral deposits have 
been discovered and towards border tracts where there already exist populations 
of the sameethnic groups in adjacent countries. (SG-CSN Study 29,1986, quoted 
in Oliveira Filho 1990b: 28-9) 
The Brazilian military believe that the international and national 
NGOs are pivotal in this subversive territorial strategy, being essen- 
tially movements aimed at encouraging ‘indigenous communities 
to control their sub-soil and enjoy political and economic self- 
determination, or even recognition as separate nations from the rest 
of national society’ so as to ‘induce the formation of vast and under- 
populated enclaves cut off from the national community which 
might become autonomous indigenous nations’.37 Under its nation- 
alist rhetoric of border protection against external threats, the Calha 
Norte Project thus consists of a traditional combination in Brazilian 
Amazonian development - large-scale mining investments, Indian 
land reduction and political control. 
The fact that mining in Indian lands is considered a geopolitically 
decisive issue in the border area of northern Amazônia does not 
mean that it is not also a significant political and economic question 
for the rest of Brazilian Amazônia. On the contrary: 70 of the 242 
Indian lands officially recognized as such in the whole region (1987) 
are the subject of 560 mineral prospecting permits and of 1685 
applications for such permits; the subsoil of 33.5 per cent of the 
total area of these territories is under the control of mining com- 
panies; and placer-mining groups operate in 21 of the 242 Indian 
lands. Thus, although there are many other economic interests also 
present in Indian territories in central Amazônia (agri-business, 
timber operations, hydroelectric plants, etc.; see Albert, 1990; 
CEDVPETI, 1990), the expansion of lhe mining frontier in the 
1980s (Becker, 1990: Ch. 4) was fundamental to SADEN’s strategy 
of extending throughout the region its model of ecological expro- 
priation and its associated network of lands placed under military 
control. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have seen that, during the ‘New Republic’ government 
(1985-go), Brazil’s official indigenist and environmental policies 
were firmly linked to a pattern of integration of Amazônia which, 
economically and politically, was a direct continuation of the 
development and national security model of the 1960s and 1970s. It 
was a model that promoted large-scale exploitation of the region’s 
natural resources for export, in the context of political stability 
guaranteed by strict military control. 
However, the social and ecological costs of this highly unequal 
and predatory economic planning caused growing protest from 
NGOs and public opinion, which then exerted increasing pressure 
on international creditors upon whose financing these projects 
depended. The advanced provisions on environment and the Indians 
in the new Brazilian Cons t i t~ t ion ,~~  and the institutional growth 
of the popular movement for democracy also played a very impor- 
tant role within the country. In consequence, the military planners 
were forced to make substantial changes in their administrative 
and political style. As a direct response to these new trends in 
both the international and national political arenas, the members 
of the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council (later 
SADEN), in collusion with business interests, have thus developed 
a new strategy. Their aims are to take control of the Brazilian 
indigenist and environmental policy in an attempt to replace the 
worn-out ideological framework of the ‘Brazilian miracle’, and 
to guarantee the armed forces’ involvement in the geopolitical 
and economic destiny of Amazônia. This survival strategy of mili- 
tary planning has consisted essentially in the creation of parallel 
administrative rules and structures in order to govern Amazonian 
development outside the formal democratic institutions considered 
too vulnerable to the pressures of national and international civil 
movements (Vainer, 1990). 
SADEN viewed NGO campaigns as an obstacle to the economic 
occupation of Amazônia, and a threat to national sovereignty; not 
only because they supposedly encourage separatism among frontier 
ethnic groups, but also, more seriously, because those pressures 
directly affect Brazil’s access to loans from the Multilateral 
Development Banks, thus reducing the availability of associated 
private credit which constitutes more than 80 per cent of Brazil’s 
foreign debt (Schwartzman and Malone, 1988: 644) .  A top priority 
‘ 
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of the military policies was, therefore, to neutralize the influence of 
indigenist and environmentalist movements on the conditions for 
social and ecological safeguards which were appended to interna- 
tional loans. This attempt to offset the weight of these movements 
was essentially made by ‘greening’ the government’s rhetoric of 
development, and by manipulating the environmental legislation. 
At the same time, the military expelled researchers and NGO 
members from politically sensitive Indian areas of Amazônia such 
as Kayapó, Tikuna, Tukano, Yanomami and Waimiri-Atroari 
(Oliveira Filho, 1988; Farage, n.d.). 
The case of the demarcation of the Yanomami lands is a particu- 
larly good example of the administrative manoeuvres carried out 
by the Brazilian armed forces as a cover-up for the high social and 
ecological costs of the continuing military-business development 
planning in Brazilian Ama~Ônia.~’ This analysis of the military 
model for ecological expropriation of Indian lands developed by 
the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council/SADEN 
during the civilian government of the ‘New Republic’ provides 
challenging issues for environmentalist NGOs and for international 
institutions involved in the financing of development ,projects in 
Brazilian Amazônia. It draws attention to the need for the NGOs to 
monitor the political impact of their campaigns closely in order to 
thwart governmental manipulation of conservationist concepts, 
to the detriment of Indian populations and their habitat. It also 
brings to light the necessity for the Multilateral Development Banks 
to improve their criteria for assessing the indigenist and ecological 
projects submitted to them, especially with regard to the analysis of 
the political context surrounding the policies to be implemented by 
governmental  agencie^.^' Lastly, the analysis of the Yanomami 
case shows the interest - in the ‘political ecology’ perspective pro- 
posed by Schmink and Wood (1987) - of studies focusing on the 
interaction of civil movements and state strategies in the definition 
and application of development policies for Amazônia. 
, 
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE COLLOR 
THE MILITARY (JUNE 91) 
ADMINISTRATION: ENVIRONMENT, INDIANS AND 
With regard to  Amazon development policy, the government of 
President Collor (first Brazilian president elected by direct vote 
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since 1960) has inherited a situation of antagonism between the 
democratic resurgence movement in the country and the military, 
who continue to pursue an unconstitutional administrative strategy 
to maintain their control over the region. In its first months (from 
March 1990), this new administration showed some signs of neutra- 
lizing the most conspicuous and anachronistic aspects of the mili- 
tary hegemony in the Amazon. But, superficial and publicity oriented 
as they were, these attempts provoked negative reactions from the 
armed forces which clearly indicate that the military role in Brazilian 
development policies for Amazônia has not yet weakened. 
President Collor visited the Yanomami area on 24 March 1990 to 
announce the creation of a special committee to study the territorial 
zoning of Brazilian Amazônia, and to reformulate the Calha Norte 
Project (Folha de S .  Paulo, 24 March 1990; O Globo, 25 March 
1990). Two days earlier he had declared that the project would 
only continue on the condition that its central focus was the pro- 
tection of Amazonian ecology (Folha de S .  Paulo, 22-24 March 
1990; A Critica, 23 March 1990). The appointment by Collor of 
J. Lutzenberger, an internationally known militant ecologist who 
openly criticized the Calha Norte Project, as State Secretary of the 
Environment, also contributed to tension between the President and 
the military (A Critica, 30 March 1990; Folha de S. Paulo, 11 May 
1 990). 
Soon afterwards, the press made public a document of the Escola 
Superior de Guerra (ESG) entitled ‘The Structure of National Power 
for the Year 2001. 1990-2000: the Vital Decade for a Modern and 
Democratic Brazil’, dated 15 March 1990 (Folha de S .  Paulo, 29 
May 1990). In a chapter on ‘Policies and Strategies for Amazônia’ 
this document rephrased, in an astonishingly anachronistic style, 
the old Brazilian military obsessions with national security in 
the region. Among the ‘obstacles’ to the national integration of 
Amazônia were quoted the excessive number and size of Indian 
lands, especially in international frontier areas, and the campaigns 
of international environmentalist and indigenist NGOs, accused of 
using these ‘indigenous enclaves’ as bridgeheads (with the complicity 
of the governments of developed countries) to internationalize parts 
of Amazônia. The document is particularly vehement against the 
‘radical preservation of Indian cultures’ as ‘cysts within national 
space’, and against ‘preservationist activism’: it even goes so far as 
to consider recourse to war against international pressures for the 
maintenance of ‘anthropological cysts’ in the country, as opposed 
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to the ‘permanent national aims’ of integration and sovereignty. 
These ESG arguments attracted public attention again in 1991 when 
declarations of the military commander of Amazônia claimed, given 
foreign pressures on the region, it could ‘transform itself into a huge 
Vietnam’ (see Correio Brasiliense, 18 June 1991). 
Even though the Escola Superior de Guerra no longer has the 
political importance it once had as a ‘think tank’ for the military 
dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘family resemblance’ its 
documents have with SADEN directives and military-development 
projects (defended by the ESG text) indicates - to say the least - 
that the Brazilian armed forces are far from renouncing their hege- 
mony over development policies in Amazônia. 
Since mid-1990 several facts indicate that the military may indeed 
be continuing to interfere in the environmental and indigenist 
policies of the Collor administration, although less obviously than 
during the ‘New Republic’, and not without opposition from within 
the government (see Gazeta Mercantil, 10 October 1990). As a 
matter of fact, President Collor’s Amazonian policy does reveal a 
painstaking attempt to conciliate divergent political factions in his 
government - one relatively open to the NGO community’s views 
(essentially in order to better the international image of the coun- 
try), the other linked to the military development model (still 
sustained by strong parallel structures under army control in the 
public administration). 
Environmental Policy 
In September 1990 the Collor government created a Co-ordinating 
Committee of Ecological and Economic Zoning with a priority 
toward Amazônia, under the direction of the Secretariat for Stra- 
tegic Affairs (SAE) (Decree 99.540, 21 September 1990) which, 
although headed by a civilian, is the direct successor of SADEN 
and of the National Intelligence Service (SNI). The SAE was simul- 
taneously given responsibility for special ‘border projects’ including 
the Calha Norte Project which was reactivated with a new budget 
in March 1991 (BSB Brasil, 25 September 1990; Folha de S. Paulo 
30 September 1990, 11 March 1991). The SAE was also given con- 
trol over the CONAMA (National Council of the Environment), 
the collegial committee entrusted to assist the President in the 
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formulation of Brazilian environmental policy (see IstotVSenhor, 
5 June 1991: 24).41 
This ‘militarization’ of the environmental policy of the Collor 
government through the SAE - despite opposition from the 
IBAMA and the Secretariat for the Environment run by J. 
Lutzenberger - has been the object of press comments since the 
end of 1990 (Folha de S .  Paulo, 1 November 1990, 26 December 
1990). It has recently been condemned by representatives of more 
than 500 Brazilian environmental NGOs at their Fourth National 
Forum in São Paulo (CEDI, 15 April 1991, in Aconteceu 564: 5). 
The parallel planning and executive functions given to the SAE, 
to the detriment of the formal administrations in charge of the 
environmental question, seem to indicate that the debate over the 
preservation of Amazônia is still treated by the Collor government 
above all as a topic of national security, the SAE zoning project 
being considered, in the first place, a strategic political element 
in the public refurbishing of Brazil’s ecological image through the 
Rio-92 UN Environmental Conference (see O Estado de S .  Paulo, 
12 March 1991). 
Indigenist Policy 
In July 1990 the Collor administration created an inter-ministerial 
work group to define a new indigenist policy, including members of 
the SAE and the President’s military cabinet (Decree 99.405, 19 July 
1990). In August, an air force sergeant of the reserve was appointed 
as FUNAI’s new president (Folha de S .  Paulo, 17 August 1990) 
and his first public declarations were to justify the dismembering 
of Yanomami lands, defend the Calha Norte Project and recom- 
mend the economic use of natural resources in Indian lands by 
non-Indians (Folha de S. Paulo, 10 September 1990). The inter- 
ministerial work group on indigenist policy released its proposal in 
November. Although its assistance items (education and health) 
were acknowledged as progressive, all aspects regarding the legal 
status of the Indians and their lands were visibly inspired by tradi- 
tional military views (automatic ‘emancipation’ of the Indians, voice 
given to non-Indian economic interest in the demarcation process of 
Indian lands). These unconstitutional points of the proposal were 
rejected not only by the NGO community but also by the Attorney 
General’s office (CEDI, 12 November 1990, 11  December 1990, 
60 Bruce Albert 
in Aconteceu 554 and 556; Porantim 133-134). In December, Presi- 
dent Collor announced the revocation of the decrees introduced 
by SADEN in 1987 creating ‘Indigenous Areas’ and ‘Indigenous 
Colonies’ (see notes 9 and 21) and, at the same time, the creation of 
an inter-ministerial committee to define a new administrative system 
for the demarcation of Indian lands (Hoje em Dia, 27 December 
1990). In January 1991, a decree formalized this committee which 
also included members of the SAE and of the President’s military 
cabinet (Decree 99.971, 3 January 1991). 
Only in February 1991 did President Collor finally begin to 
give some definition to his indigenist policy, through the enact- 
ment of five decrees (22-26,4 February 1991). Four of these (23-26) 
withdraw from FUNAI the responsibility for different aspects of 
state assistance to Indians, transferring it to the Ministries of 
Health, Education and Agriculture, and to the Secretariat for the 
Environment. The fifth decree (22) deals with the demarcation of 
Indian lands. It leaves FUNAI with only the technical responsibility 
for proposing demarcation limits, opens up the possibility for revi- 
sion of previous demarcations and gives all the power of decision- 
making regarding the submitted demarcations and revisions to the 
Ministry of Justice. 
A press release by the União das Nações Indígenas and several 
indigenist NGOs criticized these measures for creating a dispersed 
system of assistance without co-ordination and, above all, for giving 
discretionary powers to the Ministry of Justice (against the spirit of 
the Constitution); powers which could again favour the arbitrary 
influence of geopolitical and economic criteria in the demarcation 
of Indian lands (CEDI, 8 February 1991, in Aconteceu 559: 11). It 
must be said here that President Collor’s Minister of Justice is seen 
as a symbol of the military dictatorship, having been minister during 
three of its governments between 1967 and 1985 (those of Costa e 
Silva, Medici and Figueiredo). 
In March 1991, FUNAI published a new directive (239,20 March 
1991) on the technical process of ‘identification’ of Indian lands, the 
first step of the official procedures leading to demarcation (Oliveira 
Filho, 1990a). However, no measures have been taken yet on the 
147 demarcation proposals awaiting a government decision (CEDI/ 
PETI, 1990: 19). During its first year, the Collor government did 
not demarcate a single Indian territory (see CEDI, 1 April 1991, in 
Aconteceu 563: 11). The constitutional deadline set for all demarca- 
tions is October 1993, and 237 Indian lands are yet to be demarcated 
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(45 per cent of the 526 Indian territories in the country). The ques- 
tion thus remains entirely open as to whether or not this new govern- 
ment will reject the military pressures which led to the freezing of 
demarcations and the reduction of Indian lands during the ‘New 
Republic’ (Leite, 1990a, 1990b). 
The Yanomami Land Question 
The way the Yanomami case has been treated during the first year 
of the Collor administration has been rather ambiguous. On the one 
hand it has shown some, though not enough, efforts to assist those 
Indians; on the other, it has complied with a total administrative 
inertia on the land issue. 
The scandal in the world press about the genocide of the 
Yanomami in early 1990 forced the government to take imme- 
diate measures. Operations were launched in May and October 1990 
and February 1991 by FUNAI and the federal police to evacuate the 
gold-panners from Yanomami lands and to dynamite their illegal 
airstrips. Although groups of placer-miners continue to reinvade the 
core of Yanomami lands after each operation, their total number 
has been drastically reduced - from about 40,000 in 1989 (APC, 
1989; CCPY, 1989), to approximately 7000 in June 1991 (Folha de 
S. Paulo, 4 July 1991). A Yanomami health project, first announced 
in November 1990 (Jornal do Brasil, 30 November 1990), was finally 
created by the Ministry of Health in April 1991 (Decree 316, 11  April 
1991). Violence against the Yanomami, however, persists and, 
although efforts are being made to curb malaria epidemics, the 
disease still rages over their territory.42 
On 19 April 1991 (National Indian Day), President Collor at last 
revoked the disastrous delimitation of Yanomami lands put into 
force by the government of the ‘New Republic’. Two directives 
issued by the Minister of Justice later ordered the study of a new 
delimitation within six months (223 and 224, 2 May 1991). In the 
meantime the Yanomami area has been placed under an interdict. 
This annulment of the SADEN reduction of Yanomami lands was 
certainly welcome, but it is no more than a much delayed ratifica- 
tion of a federal court decision of September 1990 to recognize 
their territory legally (CCPY, 1991; Folha de S.  Paulo, 26 Sep- 
tember 1990).43 One might say that this six-month interdiction, far 
from offering a definitive solution, seems rather to be a strategy 
62 Bruce Albert 
for delaying the appropriate delimitation, while giving public 
opinion the false impression that an effective decision has been 
made.& In fact, it is difficult to understand why there should be a 
need for any new studies, when it is known that FUNAI’s demarca- 
tion project of 1985 (see note 8) was based on lengthy research 
carried out after a first interdiction of Yanomami lands in 1982 
(Directive of the Minister of Home Affairs 25, 9 March 1982). 
In October 1990 President Collor received two projects for the 
creation of a single ‘Yanomami Indian Land’, one from FUNAI, the 
other from IBAMA (CEDI, 30 October 1991, in Aconteceu 3: 11). 
Once more this decision has been delayed not only because of SAE’s 
opposition to the legalization of a large and continuous Indian area 
along the northern Amazonian border, but also because of lobbying 
by local politicians who support the gold-panners (Folha de S.  
Paulo, 8 March 1991; Jornal de Brasilia, 31 March 1991; CEDI, 
1 April 1991, in Aconteceu 564: 10). This alliance between the 
military and the placer-mining lobby is not new. At the end of the 
‘New Republic’, representatives of the Brazilian armed forces had 
gone so far as to give overt support to the presence of gold-panners 
in the Yanomami lands (Folha de S. Paulo, 20 December 1989; 
O Globo, 4 February 1990). Moreover, the world’s largest tin ore 
mining company, the Brazilian Paranapanema, has recently shown 
interest in claiming the heartland of Yanomami territory (CEDI, 
14 June 1991, in Aconteceu 568: lo), while the Brazilian press 
revealed a project supported by ‘a strong faction of the government’ 
to cut out 38 per cent of the Yanomami lands for mining operations 
(Folha de S. Paulo, 8 July 1991). 
One can only wonder if President Collor will have the political 
strength to antagonize such powerful interests and proceed to recog- 
nize appropriately Yanomami lands rights according to the Brazi- 
lian Constitution (Article 231), the 1985 FUNAI project and the 
federal court. This has been the plea of the Brazilian NGOs for thir- 
teen years. It will certainly depend on the intensity of international 
pressure before the Rio-92 UN Conference takes place (see Folha de 
S .  Paulo, 26 June 1991). 
NOTES 
1 am grateful to C. Andujar (CCPY), D. Buchillet (ORSTOM), A. Ramos (UNB), 
S. Baines (UNB) and the anonymous referees of Development and Change for their 
helpful comments on previous versions of this article. 
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1. Article 231 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution gives a broad definition of the 
concept of Indian land which includes not only the areas actually inhabited, but also 
all those areas that are necessary for the economic and social activities of the Indian 
communities, at present and in the future (see Allen, 1989; Carneiro da Cunha, 1990; 
Coelho dos Santos, 1989; Damasceno, 1990;. Gaiger, 1989a; Santilli, 1989a; Souza 
Filho, 1990). 
2. The role of the ‘Indian Assemblies’ organized during this period by the 
Conselho Indigenista Missionario (CIMI) deserves a special mention. 
3. See Miyamoto (1987) on the National Security Council. 
4. According to FUNAI’s ‘Position Paper’ 190 (1988), the Yanomami in Brazil 
numbered 9910 in 1988, spread over 120 communities. 
5. According to the Indian Statute (Article 28), the purpose of aparque indigena 
is to protect and give assistance to the Indian communities and to preserve their 
environment. For a recent compilation of Brazilian indigenist legislation, see 
Guimarães (1989a). 
6. These directives were also signed by the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister 
of Agrarian Reform and Development and the Secretary-General of the National 
Security Council. 
7. The title of a FUNAI press release of 19 August 1990. 
8. FUNAI’s Directive 1817/E of 8 January 1985, defined the boundaries of the 
territory effectively occupied by the Yanomami (9,419,108 ha) as a preliminary 
administrative measure to the creation of a ‘Yanomami National Indian Park’. 
9. Such as those defined by Decree 94.946 (23 September 1987) as areas ‘occupied 
or inhabited either by unacculturated forest dwellers or by those undergoing the 
initial stages of acculturation’. 
10. IBAMA was created in February 1989 (see IBAMA, 1989b). 
11. For further details see Article 5 of the Brazilian Forestry Code (Law 4.771, 
15 September 1965); the Regulation of National Parks of Brazil (Decree 84.017, 
21 September 1979); Article 22 of the Indian Statute; and Directive 745 (6 July 1988) 
of FUNAI as well as IBDF/FBCN (1982: 20-1,25-6). See also Gaiger (1989b: 20-1) 
for a legal commentary on the incompatibility between National Forests, National 
Parks and Indian lands. 
12. A more recent document mentions a total of 451 permits and applications 
for mineral prospecting pending in Yanomami lands (Governo de Roraima, 
1989). 
13. In fact, not even all inhabited areas are included: at least twenty-three villages 
were left out of the nineteen ‘Indigenous Areas’. 
14. Article 1,  5 3, of Memorandum 107 (1988) sent by the Director of the Depart- 
ment of Forestry to the President of IBDF (6 September 1988). 
15. Decrees 97.512 to 97.530 (17 February 1989) (nineteen ‘Indigenous Areas’) and 
97.545-97.546 (1 March 1989) (two National Forests). 
16. The new name, since September 1988, of the Secretariat-General of the 
National Security Council. 
17. Decree Justification EM1 8(1989) of Decree 97.627 (10 April 1989). Moreover, 
Article 13 of Law 7.805 (18 July 1989) which rules the granting of permission for 
gold-panning, mentions the creation of ‘areas of placer-mining’. 
18. Decrees 98.890 (25 January 1990) and 98.959 and 98.960 (15 February 1990) 
(‘areas for placer-mining activities of Santa Rosa, Uraricoera, and Catrimani-Couto 
de Magalhães’). 
. 
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19. With a view to ‘preserving the environment necessary for the life of forest- 
dwelling populations’ (Forestry Code, Article 3, item g). 
20. That the use of the concept of National Forest in the demarcation of 
Yanomami lands as laid down in Directive 250 was unconstitutional was confirmed 
by a Public Civil Enquiry by the Attorney General (3 October 1989). 
21. The ‘Indigenous Colonies’ are areas ‘occupied or inhabited either by accul- 
turated Indians or Indians in an advanced process of acculturation’ (Decree 96.946, 
23 September 1987). FUNAI’s Directive PP/1.098 (6 September 1988), defines the 
criteria for evaluating the degree of acculturation of Indian groups. 
22. For information on the Waiãpi National Forest project, see FUNAI’s ‘Position 
Paper’ 193 (1988) and ‘Information Paper’ 015 (SUAF) (1989). 
23. Under the 1988 Constitution and with a new name, National Defence Council 
(CDN), the former National Security Council (CSN) preserves many of the attributes 
it enjoyed before. Article 91, paragraph lo-III of the Constitution thus empowers 
it to ‘propose the criteria and conditions for the use of areas that are indispensable 
for the security of the national territory, and to rule on how they are to be used, 
especially on the border strip and in those areas related to the preservation and 
exploitation of natural resources of any kind’. 
24. Decrees 95.859 (22 March 1988) and 97.956 (30 March 1989). The lands con- 
trolled by the army in Amazônia amount to 10,113,215 ha. All these reserved lands 
are located in areas that are considered to be politically ‘problematical’ - border 
areas, areas of land conflicts or Indian areas (see Folha de S. P d o ,  27 and 29 
September 1989; Tempo e Presença, 244-5: 31). 
25. The responsibility of the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council 
for the definition of Indian lands was made official by Decree 94.945 (23 September 
1987). 
26. See Secretariat-General of the National Security Council study 007/3a Seçaõ 
(1986) entitled ‘The Indian Question and the Risks for the Sovereignty and Integrity 
of the National Territory’, quoted in Senhor (3 November 1987). 
27. See the letter from the Union of Indigenous Nations (UNI) to the co-ordinators 
of PMACI and to the representatives of IDB dated 1 May 1988 (UNI, 1989: 44); also 
see O Estado de S.Paulo (17 September 1988) and Jornal do Brasil (28 September 
1988). 
28. See the IDB cable OD9/BR-665/88 to SEPLAN 8 December 1988 (IDB, 1988) 
and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) Memorandum to CEDI, São Paulo, on 
the PMACI meeting at IDB (EDF, 1989). See also Jornal do Brasil (1 April 1989) and 
Correio Brasiliense (6 September 1989). 
29. See Deia (1988); Veja (9 and 23 November 1989). Current estimates reckon 
that of the 4,988,939 km2 o f h ” ô n i a  legal, deforestation has reached 582,869 km2, 
or 11.7 per cent. The destruction of the rainforest amounts to 344,706 km2 of a total 
of 4,127,087 km2 (8.4 per cent); the destruction of the cerrado (shrub savanna) 
areas amounts to 238,163 km2 of a total of 861,852 km2 (27.6 per cent) (Fearnside, 
1989: 9). 
30. A parliamentary committee of enquiry was set up in March 1989 to ‘investigate 
the accusations of devastation of Amazon flora and the role of foreigners in these 
accusations’ (Correio Brasiliense, 1 March 1989). 
31. Also, approvals for new fiscal incentives and credit for agri-business projects 
in Amazônia were suspended for a period of ninety days (Decree 96.943, 12 October 
1988). The Presidency of the Republic recommended that the Ministry of Finance 
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suspend exports of unsawn logs, and that the Ministry of Agrarian Reform 
and Development adapt the legislation pertaining to land reform to the environ- 
mental norms established by the new Constitution (SADEN memos O01 and 002, 
1988). 
32. Addendum to the Decree Justification EM1 O01 (12 October 1988). 
33. See Correio Brasiliense, 1, 8, 9 and 28 March: ‘Environment Mobilizes the 
Military’, ‘General Fears Campaign’, ‘Military React to Interference in Amazônia’, 
’Covetousness Motive for the Campaign for Amazônia’; A Crítica 8, 9 and 13 
March: ‘Military Presence in Amazônia is Increased’, ‘Military do not Accept 
Criticism on Amazônia’, ‘Army Alert to Foreign Pressures’. 
34. SADEN 1988: ‘Programa Nossa Natureza. Anexo D (Memento do relatório 
dos GTIs a NGA do “Programa Nossa Natureza”) - Pressupostos economico- 
sociais’ (GTI VI documents). 
35. All the estimates that follow are based on data from CEDI/Museu Nacional 
(1987) and CEDI/CONAGE (1988). 
36. Data of July 1987. The mineral survey permits are valid for three years and 
are renewable; the validity period of the applications is unrestricted and results in a 
virtual blockading of the area (Ricardo and Rocha, 1990). 
37. Conference by Colonel A. Nascimento on the Calha Norte Project at the 
Higher Institute of Amazônia Studies (ISEA) in Manaus (6 January 1988). 
38. See Ch. VI of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution on environment, and Ch. VI11 
on Indian rights. 
39. For a detailed account of the tragic impact of Calha Norte on the Yanomami 
Indians see Albert (1991). 
40. When SADEN’s ecological propaganda was broadcast in 1989, 46,000 km2 
of tropical forest - an area equivalent to the state of Rio de Janeiro - had 
already been destroyed (INPE quoted in Folha de S. Paulo, 26 June 1990), and mer- 
cury pollution of Amazonian rivers by gold-panners had reached critical proportions 
(Jornal do Brasil, 6 March 1990, 16 July 1990; Martinelli et al., 1989; Pfeiffer et al. 
1990). 
41. The SAE extended its powers so far as to forbid the public distribution 
of maps of Brazilian Amazônia published by SUDAM, the civil administration 
in charge of Amazonian development planning (L.F. Pinto, 12 April 1991, in 
Aconteceu 564: 4). 
42. Seven Indians were murdered or wounded by garimpeiros in September 1990 
and March 1991 at Olomai, Homoshi, Shilobi and Sheriana airstrips (Folha de 
S. Paulo, 11 September 1990; CCPY, 1990; O Estado de S. Paulo, 22 March 1991). 
A recent Church report mentions seventy Yanomami deaths resulting from malaria 
in Roraima state during the first three months of 1991 (Folha de S. Paulo, 18 May 
1991); see also, on the dramatic Yanomami health situation (Correio Brasiliense, 26 
May 1991; Folha de S. Paulo, 18 June 1991). 
43. This decision of 24 September 1990 was, in fact, a confirmation of two 
previous judgments (20 October 1989 and 10 April 1990) never taken into account 
by the executive power. 
44. It must be noted here that if the nineteen ‘Indigenous Areas’ and three ‘placer- 
mining reserves’ illegally created in Yanomami lands have been revoked, the two 
National Forests of Amazonas and Roraima in which they were enclosed are still in 
effect (CEDI, 29 April 1991, in Aconteceu 565: IO). 
66 Bruce Albert 
REFERENCES 
A Crítica various issues. Manaus, Amazonas. 
Aconteceu (biweekly bulletin of CEDI) various issues. São Paulo. 
Albert, B. (1987) ‘Les Indiens et la Nouvelle République’, Les Temps Modernes 
Albert, B. (ed.) (1990) ‘Brésil: indiens et développement en Amazonie’, Ethnies 
Albert, B. (1991) ‘Geopolítica militar e frente garimpeira no norte amazõnico: os 
Allegretti, M.H. (1988) ‘Natureza e política externa brasileira’, Tempo e Presença 
Allen, E. (1989) ‘Brazil: Indians and the New Constitution’, Third World Quarterly 
Allen, E. (1992) ‘Calha Norte: Military Development in Brazilian Amazônia’, 
Almeida, A.W.B. de (1989) ‘O tempo dos primeiros encontros’, Tempo e Presença 
APC (Ação Pela Cidadania) (1989) Roraima: o aviso da morte. São Paulo: 
CCPY/CEDI/CIMI. 
APC (Ação Pela Cidadania) (1990) Yanomami: a todospovos da terra. São Paulo: 
CCPY/CEDI/CIMI/NDI. 
Arruda, A. de (1983) A Escola Superior de Guerra. São Paulo: Edições GRD; 
Brasília: INL/FN Pró-Memoria. 
Assembléia Nacional Constituinte (1988) ‘Constituição da República Federativa do 
Brasil’. Brasília: Assembléia Nacional Constituinte (5 October). 
Bayma Denys, R. (1989) ‘Declaracão do General Bayma Denys, Ministro chefe do 
gabinete militar da Presidência da República na Comissão de desenvolvimento 
urbano, interior e indio da Câmara dos Deputados’, unpublished manuscript, 
Brasília (26 April). 
491: 121-41. 
(special issue): 11-12. 
Yanomami face ao projeto Calha Norte‘, Antropologia e Indigenismo 2. 
330: 14-15. 
ll(4): 148-65. 
Development and Change 23(1): 71-99. 
244-5: 22-4. 
Becker, B.K. (1990) Amazônia. São Paulo: Ática. 
BSB Brasil (25 September 1990). Brasília. 
Buchillet, D. (1990) ‘Pari-Cachoeira: le laboratoire tukano du Projet Calha Norte’, 
Carneiro da Cunha, M. (1984) ‘Ofensivas contra os direitos indígenas’, Povos 
Carneiro da Cunha, M. (1990) ‘L’État, les indiens et la nouvelle Constitution’, 
CCPY (Commissão Pela Criação do Parque Yanomami) (1988) Yanomami Urgente, 
CCPY (Commissão Pela Criação do Parque Yanomami) (1989) Urihi, 11. São 
CCPY (Commissão Pela Criação do Parque Yanomami) (1990) Yanomami Update, 
CCPY (Commissão Pela Criação do Parque Yanomami) (1991) Yanomami Update, 
CEDI (Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação)/Museu Nacional (1987) 
Ethnies 11-12: 128-35. 
Indígenas no Brasil 1983 (Aconteceu especial) 14: 11-13. 
Ethnies 11-12: 12-15. 
4. São Paulo: CCPY. 
Paulo: CCPY. 
23, 25 September. São Paulo: CCPY. 
32, 23 April. São Paulo: CCPY. 
Terras indígenas no Brasil. São Paulo: CEDI. 
The Environment, the Military and the Yanomarni 67 
CEDVCONAGE (Coordenação Nacional dos Geólogos) (1988) Empresas de 
CEDVPETI (Projecto Estudo sobre Terras Indigenas no Brasil) 1990 Terras 
CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionario) (1989) ‘PROFFAO: o “Calha Sul” ’, 
CNS (Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros) (1989) Chico Mendes. São Paulo: CEDI. 
Coelho dos Santos, S. (1989) Povos indkenase a Constituinte. Porto Alegre: Editora 
Comblin, J. (1980) A ideologia da segurança nacional. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização 
Correio Brasiliense various issues. Brasília. 
CPI/SP (Commissão PrÓ-Índio/São Paulo) (1985) A questão da mineração en2 terra 
CS (Cultural Survival) (1985) ‘The First World Conference on Cultural Parks’, 
Damasceno, F.A. (1990) ‘Legislação indigenista: proteçã0 e respeito sem tutela’, 
Deia, C. (1988) ‘Cresce devastação da floresta amazônica’, Espacial 68: 9-10. 
EDF (1989) ‘Memorandum: Reunião no BID Sobre o PMACI, 26/4/88’. 
Farage, N. (n.d.) ‘Autorizações para pesquisa em área indígena: quanto o oculto C 
Fearnside, P.M. (1989) ‘Como frear o desmatamento’, Tempo e Presença 244-45: 
Folha de Boa Vista (21 August 1988). Boa Vista, Roraima. 
Folha de S. Paulo various issues. São Paulo. 
FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Indio) Directive 1817/E, 8 January 1985; Directive 
745,6 July 1988; Directive PP/1.098,6 September 1988; Directive 239,20 March 
1991; Position Paper 190,1988; Position Paper 193,1988; Information Paper 015 
(SUAF), 1989. Brasília: FUNAI. 
Gaiger, J.M.G. (ed.) (1989a) Direitos indkenas na Constituição Brasileira de 1988 
(e outros ensaios). Brasília: CIMI. 
Gaiger, J.M.G. (1989b) ‘Terras indígenas e figuras ambientais’, in J.M.G. Gaiger 
(ed.) Direitos indkenas na Constituição Brasileira de 1988 (e outros ensaios), 
pp. 18-21. Brasília: CIMI. 
mineração e terras indkenas na Amazônia. São Paulo: CEDI. 
indigenas no Brasil. São Paulo: CEDI. 
Tempo e Presença 244-45: 26-7. 
de UFSC-Movimento. 
Brasileira. 
indígena, Cadernos da CPI/SP series, No. 4. São Paulo: CPI/SP. 
Cultural Survival Quarterly 9(1): 25. 
Porantirn 130: 4. 
Washington, DC: Environmental Defense Fund. 
Óbvio’, unpublished manuscript. 
8-12. 
Gazeta Mercantil (10 October 1990). São Paulo. 
Governo de Roraima (1989) Projeto Meridiano 62. Boa Vista: Governo de Roraima. 
Guimarães, P.M. (1988) ‘Amazônia: militares conduzem a política de ocupação’, 
Guimarães, P.M. (1989a) Legislação indigenista Brasileira Coletanea. São Paulo: 
Guimarães, P.M. (1989b) Demarcação das terras indkenas. A agressão do Governo. 
Hoje em Dia (27 December 1990). Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais. 
IBAMA Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente (1989a) Organização búsica. Brasília: 
IBAMA Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente (1989b) Programa Nossa Natureza. 
Porantim 113: 3. 
Edições Loyola. 
Brasília: CIMI. 
IBAMA. 
Leis e Decretos. Brasília: IBAMA. 
68 
\. 
Bruce Albert 
IBDF/FBCN (Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento FlorestaVFederação 
Brasileira de Conservação da Natureza) (1982) Plano do sistema de unidades de 
conservação do Brasil. II Etapa. Brasília: IBDF. 
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) (1988) ‘Cable OD9/BR-665’ in ‘Special 
Report. Porto Velho-Rio Branco Project Loans lSO/IC-BR and 503/OC-BR7. 
Washington: IDB. 
Instituto Brasileiro do Desenvolvimento Florestal (1988) ‘IBDF Memorandum 107, 
“Regulamento dos Florestas Nacionais (Proposta retirada do VI Encontro de 
Diretores de FLONAS)” ’ Brasília: Department of Forestry (6 September). 
Istoé/Senhor (formerly Senhor) various issues. São Paulo (weekly). 
Jornal do Brasil various issues. Rio de Janeiro. 
Jornal de Brasília (31 March 1991). Brasília. 
Leitaõ, R.S.B. (1990) ‘O Programa Nossa Natureza. O controle dos recursos naturais 
e as propostas dos militares para o setor ambiental no Brasil’, Antropologia e 
Indigenismo 1: 109-16. 
Leite, J.C.F. (199Oa) ‘Terras indígenas no Brasil: o governo Sarney’, Resenha di 
Debate 1: 2-12. 
Leite, J.C.F. (1990b) ‘1987-1990: redução das terras indígenas e paralisia de pro- 
cessos’, in CEDVPETI Terras indkenas no Brasil, pp. 5-10. São Paulo: CEDI. 
Lima, A.C. de S .  (1987) ‘Sobre indigenismo, autoritarismo e nacionalidade: con- 
siderações sobre a Constituição do discurso e da pratica da Proteqio Fraternal 
no Brasil’, in J.P. de Oliveira Filho (ed.) Sociedades indigenas e indigenismo 
no Brasil, pp. 149-204. Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo: Editora UFRJ e Marco 
Zero. 
Mahar, D.J. (1989) Government Policies and Deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon 
Region. Washington: World Bank. 
Manchete (28 January 1989). Rio de Janeiro (weekly). 
Martinelli, L.A., Ferreira, J.R., Forsberg, B.R. and Victoria, R.L. (1989) ‘Gold 
Rush Produces Mercury Contamination in Amazon‘, Cultural Survival Quarterly 
Mattos, C. de M. (1980) Umageopolíticapan-Amazônica. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca 
do Exército Editora. 
Mattos, C. de M. (1983) ‘A Integraçã0 Latino Americana e o universo Amazônico’, 
in Instituto de Altos Estudios de America Latina EI universo Amazônico y la 
integracíon Latino Americana, pp. 203-29. Caracas: Universidad Simon Bolivar. 
Menezes, M.A. (1990) ‘Reservas extrativistas. Por uma reforma agraria ecológica’, 
Ciência Hoje 1 l(64): 4-6. 
Ministério da Agricultura (1988) ‘Decree Justification EM1 001’. Brasília: Ministério 
da Agricultura (12 October). 
Ministério do Interior. Directive25,g March 1982; Directive 160,13 September 1988; 
Directive 250, 18 November 1988; Decree Justification EM1 8, 10 April 1989. 
Brasília: Ministério do Interio. 
Ministério da Justiça (1991) ‘Directives 223 and 224’. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça 
Ministério da Saúde (1991) ‘Decree 316’. Brasília: Ministério do Saúde (11 April). 
Miyamoto, S .  (1987) ‘Conselho de Segurança Nacional e politica brasileira’, Tempo 
e Presença 223: 11-12. 
Miyamoto, S. (1989) ‘Diplomacia e militarismo: o Projeto Calha Norte e a ocupação 
do espaço Amazônico’, Revista Brasileira de Ciência Politica l(1): 145-63. 
13(1): 32-4. 
(2 May). 
The Environment, the Military and the Yanomami 69 
O Estado de S. Paulo various issues. São Paulo. 
O Globo various issues. Rio de Janeiro. 
O Jornal (24 February 1989). Boa Vista, Roraima. 
Oliveira, A.C.A. de and Born, R.H. (1989) ‘Programa Nossa Natureza, epílogo con- 
gressual’, Tempo e Presença 244-45: 29-30. 
Oliveira Filho, J.P. de (1985) ‘Contexto e horizonte ideológico: reflexões sobre o 
Estatuto do indio’, in S. Coelho dos Santos et al. (eds) Sociedades indkenas e 
o direito, pp. 17-30. Florianópolis, Brasília: Editoria da UFSC e CNPq. 
Oliveira Filho, J.P. de (1988) ‘A Pesquisa tutelada’, Ciência Hoje 8(43): 16. 
Oliveira Filho, J.P. de (199Oa) ‘Terres indiennes et frontière Cconomique’, Ethnies 
Oliveira Filho, J.P. de (1990b) ‘Segurança das fronteiras e o novo indigenismo: 
formas e linhagem do Projeto Calha Norte’, Antropologia e Indigenismo 1: 
Oliveira Filho, J.P. de and Almeida, A.W.B. de (1985) ‘Demarcações: uma avaliação 
do Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial’, Povos Indigenus no Brasil 1984 
(Aconteceu Especial) 15: 48-52. 
Oliveira Filho, J.P. de and Almeida, A.W.B. de (1989) ‘Demarcação e reafirmaçã0 
etnica: um ensaio sobre a FUNAI’, in J.P. de Oliveira Filho (ed.) Os Poderes e 
as terras dos indios, pp. 13-75. Rio de Janeiro: Museu Nacional - UFRJ. 
Pfeiffer, W.C., Malm, O. and Souza, C.M.M. de (1990) ‘A ameaça do mercúrio nos 
garimpos’, Ciência Hoje 1 l(61): 10-12. 
Porantim (monthly publication, CIMI) Issue 133-134. Brasília. 
Presidência da República. Law 4.771, 15 September 1965 (Código Florestal - 
Forestry Code); Law 6.001, 19 December 1973 (Estatuto do indio - Indian 
Statute); Law 7.797,lO July 1989; Law 7.805, 18 July 1989; Decree 83.550,5 June 
1979; Decree 84.017, 21 September 1979; Decree 94.945, 23 September 1987; 
Decree 94.946,23 September 1987; Decree 95.859,22 March 1988; Decree 96.943, 
12 October 1988; Decree 96.944, 12 October 1988; Decree 96.946,23 September 
1988; Decrees 97.512-97.530,17 February 1989; Decrees 97.545-97.546,l March 
1989; Decree 97.627,lO April 1989; Decree 97.636,lO April 1989; Decree 97.956, 
30 March 1989; Decree 98.890,25 January 1990; Decrees 98.959 and 98.960, 15 
February 1990; Decree 99.405, 19 July 1990; Decree 99.540,21 September 1990; 
Decree 99.971, 3 January 1991; Decrees 22-26, 4 February, 1991. Brasília: 
Presidência da República. 
11-12: 16-22. 
15-33. 
Ribeiro, D. (1982) Os hdios e a civilizaçüo, 4th edn. Rio de Janeiro: Vôzes. 
Ribeiro, G.L. (1989) ’Internacionalização da Amazônia’, Boletim da Associaçüo 
Brasileira da Antropologia 7: 18. 
Ricardo, C.A. and Rocha, G .  (1990) ‘Compagnies minières et terres indiennes’, 
Ethnies 11-12: 28-32. 
SADEN (Secretaria de Assessoramento da Defesa Nacional). Memos 001 and 002, 
1988; Programa Nossa Natureza, 1988 (GTI VI Documents); Directive 60, 
25 July 1989. Brasília: SADEN. 
Santilli, M. (1987) ‘Projeto Calha Norte: tutela militar e política de fronteiras’, 
Tempo e Presença 223: 17-19. 
Santilli, M. (1989a) ‘Notes on the Constitutional Rights of the Brazilian Indians’, 
Cultural Survival Quarterly 13(1): 13-15. 
Santilli, M. (1989b) ‘Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica: um instrumento 
diplomático a serviço da retórica nacionalista’, Tempo e Presença 244-5: 40-1. 
Y 
c 
70 Bruce Albert 
Santilli, M. (1990) ‘Projet Calha Norte: politique indigéniste et frontières nord- 
amazoniennes’, Ethnies 11-12: 111-15. 
Schmink, M. and Wood, C. (1987) ‘The “Political Ecology” of Amazonia’, in P.D. 
Little and M.M. Horowitz (eds) Land ai Risk in the Third World: Local Level 
Perspectives, pp. 38-57. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. 
Schwartzman, S. and Malone, M. (1988) ‘Os Bancos Multilaterals de Desen- 
volvimento e o setor energético’, in L.A.0 Santos and L.M.M. de Andrade 
(eds) As Hidreléiricas do Xingu e os Povos Indígenas, pp. 63-75. São Paulo: 
Comissão Pró-indio. 
SG/CSN (1985) Desenvolvimento e seguranca na região ao norte das calhas dos rios 
Solimöes e Amazonas. Projeto Calha Norte. Brasília: SG/CSN. 
SG/CSN (1988) Calha Norte: a fronteira do futuro - 1986-1991. Brasília: SG/ 
CSN. 
Silva, G .  do C. e (1967) Geopolítica do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José 
Olympio. 
Souza Filho, C.F.M. de (1990) ‘O processo de demarcação de terras indígenas: o 
poder público federal deve aplicar o artigo 231 da Constituição’, in CEDI/PETI 
Terras indígenas no Brasil, p. 11. São Paulo: CEDI. 
Tempo e Presenp (monthly publication, CEDI) 244-5. São Paulo. 
Turner, T. (1989) ‘Five Days in Altamira. Kayapó Indians Organize Protest against 
Proposed Hydroelectric Dam’, Kuyapd Support Group Newsletter 1 : 1-3. 
UNI (União des Nações Indígenas) (1989) ‘Open Letter from Union of Indigenous 
Nations (UNI-North) to Coordinators of PMACI and Representatives of the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)’, CulturalSurvival Quarterly 13(1): 44. 
Vainer, C.B. (1990) ‘Debate’, Antropologia e Indigenismo 1: 41-5. 
Veja various issues. São Paulo (weekly). 
Bruce Albert, anthropologist (24 rue des 
Solitaires, 75019 Paris), is a researcher of the 
Institut Français de Recherche Scientifique pour 
le Développement en Coopération (ORSTOM). 
For the past four years he has worked at the 
University of Brasília as the co-organizer of an 
international research programme on the impact 
of development schemes on the indigenous 
societies of Amazônia in Brazil. He recently 
edited a special issue of the French review, 
Ethnies, on the topic ‘Brésil: Indiens et 
Développement en Amazonie’. 
Postscript: In spite of the strong opposition of the military until the 
last moment, President Collor finally authorized the demarcation of 
the claimed ‘Terra Indigena Yanomami’ on 15 November 1991. 
